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Abstract 
Has the rise of data-intensive science, or ‘big data’, revolutionized our ability to predict? 
Does it imply a new priority for prediction over causal understanding, and a diminished role 
for theory and human experts? I examine four important cases where prediction is desirable: 
political elections, the weather, GDP, and the results of interventions suggested by economic 
experiments. These cases suggest caution. Although big data methods are indeed very useful 
sometimes, in this paper’s cases they improve predictions either limitedly or not at all, and 
their prospects of doing so in the future are limited too.  
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1. Introduction: prediction, big data, and case studies 
Accurate prediction has long been possible in the laboratory and within engineered artefacts. 
But in unshielded field contexts it has usually been thought difficult, if not impossible, 
because it requires taking account of every relevant factor. Usually, the over-abundance of 
such factors makes accurate prediction infeasible. Moreover, many of these factors will likely 
be transient or sui generis and thus difficult to capture for theories or causal models, which by 
their nature tend to focus instead on factors common to many contexts. In reaction, most field 
sciences have therefore concentrated not on prediction but instead on the development of a 
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repertoire of theories, models and mechanisms. These, it is hoped, can provide explanation 
and understanding even in the absence of accurate prediction.  
 
This methodology is dominant in economics, and increasingly so in ecology, political 
science, sociology, and many other fields. But big data advocates challenge it. In particular, 
both the amount of data available and our ability to analyze it have increased enormously in 
recent years. As a result, accurate prediction of many field phenomena has become possible 
for the first time. Notable examples include the discovery of the CRISPR technology for 
genome editing in living eukaryotic cells (Lander 2016), how to get the cheapest airline 
tickets, Amazon’s personalized suggestions of new purchases, and prediction of which 
manhole covers will blow or which rent-controlled apartments will have fires in New York 
City (Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier 2013) and Facebook and Google’s experiments 
regarding page design and marketing. New analytical techniques include various forms of 
machine learning and algorithmic methods. Neural nets, for example, are behind rapid recent 
advances in natural-language translation (Lewis-Kraus 2016). 
 
The stakes are high. If big data revolutionizes our ability to predict, it is claimed, then, that 
this should lead to a transformation: a new priority for prediction over explanation or causal 
understanding. Because the new predictive successes have usually come via algorithmic or 
black-box approaches that preclude theoretical interpretation, the traditional emphasis on 
theory impedes progress in prediction and, accordingly, should be abandoned. The most eye-
catching versions of this argument have heralded the ‘death of theory’ altogether (Anderson 
2008) and a new paradigm for scientific method (Hey et al. 2009). The sheer number of 
successful new predictions, it is claimed, makes the case for a huge methodological re-
orientation (Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier 2013). Does it? 
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Two clarifications: first, ‘big data’ is a vague phrase. Some interpret it narrowly to refer only 
to particular machine learning techniques. I will interpret it more broadly, in the spirit of the 
American Association of Public Opinion Research’s definition: ‘an imprecise description of a 
range of rich and complicated set of characteristics, practices, techniques, ethical issues, and 
outcomes all associated with data’ (Japec et al. 2015, 840). A broad interpretation gives ‘big 
data’ every chance to prove its worth. My eventual conclusion, that its prospects (in one 
respect) are limited, is, then, stronger. Although a huge range of techniques fall under big 
data so understood, these techniques have sufficient core features in common that we may 
usefully assess their impact and prospects as a group. 
 
Second, big data has chalked up many impressive applications in field science already, with 
the likelihood of many more in the future (Japec et al. 2015, Foster et al. 2017). My focus, 
however, will just be on better prediction, and thus any big data method relevant to that, such 
as predictive analytics.1  
 
The heart of this paper will be four case studies of prediction of field phenomena, namely 
political elections, weather, GDP, and economic auctions. All of these cases are well 
understood by philosophers of science, having been closely studied by them for other 
purposes. Why case studies? There exist general analyses already, by philosophers of science 
and others, of what conditions are necessary for big data predictive methods to succeed 
(section 6). Case studies serve to stress-test such analyses against practical realities: when are 
the necessary conditions satisfied? When they are satisfied, are they sufficient? There is no 
 
1 I therefore will not discuss the many important political and ethical issues raised by big data methods. 
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substitute for local detail. This also enables us to assess better the role that is left for theory, 
and whether there really is no hope for causal understanding. 
 
General analyses implicitly promise that they will shed light on big data’s prospects in 
pressing actual cases. This paper proceeds the other way around, so to speak, by starting with 
pressing actual cases and then examining in those cases how effective big data methods 
actually are. Informed by this dive into particularity, we may generalize out again to get a 
better sense of big data’s prospects more widely. 
 
Big data advocates have naturally cited various success stories, but are those stories 
representative? In this paper’s cases, there is no presumption as to the potential efficacy or 
otherwise of big data methods. They are therefore neutral tests in this regard. The first three 
of them – elections, weather and GDP – are of interest because of their independent 
importance. The fourth – economic auctions – is of interest because it is an example from 
social science of successful field prediction based on the extrapolation of results from the 
laboratory. This is an influential method that may become much more widespread. 
 
Overall, the paper’s thesis is ‘generalist’ in that, as the case studies show, the same factors are 
positives and negatives for big data’s prospects across contexts. It is also generalist in that 
these factors tend to be positives and negatives for all big data methods alike. Which of these 
factors are actually pertinent in any given case, though, varies case by case. Accordingly, the 
prospects for big data also vary case by case. After going through each case study in turn 
(sections 2 to 5), the paper summarizes big data’s prospects in each (section 6), before 
assessing more generally big data’s promise for prediction and causal understanding (sections 
6 to 8). 
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2. First example: Political elections 
There are several approaches to predicting the results of political elections.2 By far the most 
successful is opinion polling.3 Polls use the voting intentions of an interviewed sample to 
serve as a proxy for those of a population. How might things go wrong? The most familiar 
way is sampling error: small samples can be unrepresentative flukes. But sampling error is 
not the only, nor even the most important, source of inaccurate predictions.4 A far bigger 
issue for pollsters is to ensure that their samples are appropriately balanced. Results will be 
biased if a sample is unrepresentative of the voting population with respect to, for instance, 
age, gender, race, or income, since these factors correlate with voting preference. This is 
quite different from sampling error: if a sampling procedure over-selects for men, say, then 
that cannot be alleviated just by making the sample bigger. Pollsters must decide exactly 
which factors to allow for. Should they rebalance, for instance, for declared political 
affiliation or for degree of interest in politics? Mistaken treatment of these latter factors has 
been the source of errors in recent US and UK election polling. Further decisions are 
necessary too: how hard and in what way to push initially undecided respondents for their 
opinions; how hard and in what way to pursue respondents who decline to participate; 
whether to sample face-to-face or by phone or online, and (in the latter cases) whether to 
 
2 See (Northcott 2015) for more details and references regarding this case. 
3 This is true even though polls are not perfectly reliable. The main alternative is to predict on the basis of 
‘fundamental’ variables that recur from election to election, most commonly macroeconomic ones such as 
growth in GDP, employment or real wages. It is uncontroversial that polls predict better. The alleged 
compensating advantage of models based on fundamentals is that at least they can explain, or provide 
understanding of, election results whereas polling cannot. I think, in fact, that neither approach explains or 
provides understanding (Northcott 2015, 2017), but I will be concerned only with prediction here. 
4 Almost 25% even of late polls of US presidential elections miss the final result by more than their official 95% 
confidence interval, yet the expected miss rate given sampling error alone should be only 5%. 
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interview or to let respondents fill out answers alone; how to assess how firmly held a 
respondent’s preference is; and how to assess the likelihood that a respondent will actually 
vote.5 Exactly how pollsters tackle such issues has been shown to significantly influence the 
accuracy of their predictions (Sturgis et al. 2016, Wells 2018).  
 
Separately from such ‘internal’ issues, the systematic aggregation of polls improves 
predictive accuracy significantly. One obvious reason is that aggregation increases effective 
sample size and therefore reduces sampling error. But mere aggregation is no cure for 
incorrect sample balancing because the optimal balancing procedure may not be the industry 
average. To assess the chance that all polls are systematically skewed in the same way 
requires sophisticated aggregation rather than taking the results of individual polls at face 
value. Overall, aggregation requires a second layer of method, quite distinct from that 
required to conduct a single poll. 
 
What role for big data in polling? Clearly, more data has helped: polling predicts better today 
in part simply because there is more polling data (Arguably, there were no reliable political 
polls at all until after World War Two). As with weather forecasting (section 3), improved 
analytical methods have also helped – polling aggregation is one example. 
 
In all of our case studies, a crucial question is: how much could prediction be improved by 
the application of big data methods in the future? What is big data’s upper limit? In the case 
of elections, the answer, alas, is that predictive paradise will remain elusive. Let us see why. 
 
 
5 So far, it is doubtful that new-technology methods such as automated ‘robo-calling’ or online surveys are any 
better predictively than more traditional live-interviewer methods (https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/which-
pollsters-to-trust-in-2018/). 
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Political campaigns increasingly use sophisticated big data methods. These have mainly taken 
the form of ‘microtargeting’ voters. Extensive data can now be collected about individual 
voters’ consumption patterns, media preferences, demographic characteristics and so on, and 
algorithms track how these factors correlate with political preference and likeliness to vote. 
Obama’s 2008 campaign, for instance, was tracking over 800 different voter variables as 
early as the Iowa caucuses in January. Campaigning material and tactics are tailored 
accordingly, at the level of individual voters, in order both to change voter preferences and 
(especially) to increase supporter turnout. Such microtargeting, which first became prominent 
in the Bush 2004 campaign, is an example of a ‘theory-free’ big data approach displacing a 
more traditional model-based one. Might it enable campaigns, or anyone, to predict election 
results better than they can with opinion polls? 
 
The key would be to identify correlations between the effect variable, i.e. actual votes, and 
the putative cause variables, i.e. consumption patterns, media preferences and so on. But 
there is a major epistemological roadblock: the limited sample of past elections means that 
public results are insufficient for training predictive algorithms, yet no other voting data are 
available because the secret ballot means that individuals’ votes are unknown.6 This data 
limitation threatens all big data techniques. 
 
An obvious response might seem just to ask individual voters how they voted. Some may 
answer falsely but, the reasoning goes, so long as most do not then we may establish 
correlations sufficiently well to generate accurate predictions. However, the salient 
comparison is whether we can predict better with big data methods than we already do with 
opinion polls. It now seems that in order to predict at all with big data methods, we must rely 
 
6 It is acknowledged by practitioners that machine learning requires a lot more data than are available in most 
cases (Foster et al. 2017, 172-3). Elections seem to be an example of this. 
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on asking voters for whom they voted. But pollsters do that already, so where is the 
comparative advantage?7 It could only come from new factors that add predictive value over 
and above existing sample balancing by pollsters.8 But this seems a dubious hope (see 
below). 
 
Moreover, the value of this kind of augmented polling of voters seems inevitably limited 
because it does not address the biggest difficulties that polling methods actually face. It is one 
thing to know what a voter’s political preference is; it is quite another to know whether they 
will actually vote. For example, polls in the 2015 UK general election were unusually 
inaccurate. Subsequent investigation revealed the main cause: pollsters assessed likeliness to 
vote by, roughly speaking, just asking voters themselves. However, errors in voters’ self-
assessment correlated with political preference, which led to biased samples. It would have 
been better to rely on historical rates of turnout for particular demographic groups (Sturgis et 
al. 2016). For the 2017 UK general election, therefore, most polling firms switched to this 
latter method. However, their predictions were again unusually inaccurate. Investigation 
revealed, roughly speaking, that the solution would have been to switch back to the 2015 
methodology (Wells 2018). In other words, there was a reversal regarding which method was 
optimal.  
 
 
7 True enough, pollsters more often ask how a voter will vote rather than retrospectively how they have voted. 
But it is not clear that the reliability is less in the former case; indeed, it might even be greater because in the 
latter case respondents’ answers can be sensitive to post hoc perceptions of the result, perhaps via a desire to be 
seen to have voted for the winning side or simply to have voted at all (Issenberg 2016, 193). 
8 It is not enough that, say, media preferences in isolation correlate with voting preference. Rather, the issue is 
whether balancing samples for media preferences adds predictive value over and above existing balancing for, 
e.g., gender and race. That is, the new variables must impact on voting independently (at least in part) of how 
the pollsters’ existing ones do. 
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This example illustrates a fundamental problem – namely non-stationarity in the underlying 
causal processes (section 6). In general, such non-stationarity is a threat to all big data 
techniques. In this case, the causal processes that relate various demographic variables to 
turnout were not stable between 2015 and 2017. The problem is that non-stationarity cannot 
be overcome by knowledge of past correlations. The same issue arises with other electoral 
variables. Do, say, the percentages of blacks, women, the rich, sports fans, and so on, that 
vote for a particular party stay constant across elections? Historically, they often have not.9 
 
One response to such non-stationarity is to stick to short-term forecasting within a single 
campaign, on the assumption that correlations are more likely to remain stable within this 
shorter timeframe. However, even within a single campaign there are many relevant non-
stationarities, especially during primaries when voter preferences – and thus the correlation 
between them and the various predictor variables – are especially volatile. Problems can arise 
during general elections too, as with temporary surges of opinion after notable events. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of a particular campaigning tactic can fade quickly with repeated 
use (Issenberg 2016). 
 
 Campaigns adopt two approaches, in part to identify, and thus to counter, such non-
stationarity. First, they often run daily polls to help calibrate their inferences from data 
regarding consumer preferences and so on. This is a sensible tactic. But the relevant point for 
our purposes is that the accuracy of any election predictions inferred from such daily polls 
still has an upper limit given by those polls’ accuracy. So, again, there is no reason to expect 
a dramatic outperformance of regular public polls.  
 
 
9 For this reason, the non-stationarity problem also applies to countries with mandatory voting, even though the 
specific problem of predicting differential turnout does not. 
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The second approach to counter non-stationarity is to utilize a campaign’s extensive non-
polling information, namely voters’ responses to doorstep, phone and other interactions. Such 
responses play a huge role, in conjunction with polling, in calibrating a campaign’s 
microtargeting algorithms and sometimes in altering them mid-campaign. These voter 
responses are predictive of voting behavior, of course, but again what matters here is whether 
they are better predictors than regular polling. As yet, there is little convincing evidence that 
they are better (see below). The fundamental problem remains the same, namely that 
campaigns cannot observe individuals’ actual votes.10 
 
Perhaps, it might be objected, non-stationarity itself can be addressed by big data methods, at 
least in principle. Presumably, any non-stationarity is a result of other causal processes, and 
these other processes might themselves generate trackable correlations. However, this 
observation is not terribly helpful because it does not provide any actionable advice beyond 
the truistic ‘look for variables that are not subject to non-stationarity’. What matters is 
whether there is non-stationarity with respect to variables actually tracked. Moreover, there is 
no guarantee that it offers a solution, even in principle. For it is quite conceivable in any 
particular domain, especially in hugely complex social domains, such as elections, that the 
underlying causal processes are so fragile and fast-changing that they never do generate 
correlations that are trackable. 
 
 
10 Similar remarks apply to the increasingly frequent use of randomized experiments and trials, which is the 
other major innovation of recent campaigns (Issenberg 2016). Such experiments usually test particular 
campaigning tactics, with efficacy measured either by changes in turnout (which can be observed) or by changes 
in proxies for actual votes such as opinions expressed on the doorstep or in focus groups. Again, there is no 
reason to think that such experiments enable us to predict overall election outcomes better than polls do (Note 
also that, as with the auctions case in section 5, the relevant data in these experiments is created in a theory-
informed way). 
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Returning to actual practice, political campaigns certainly have ways of identifying likely 
supporters and also of estimating how likely those are to vote. But then, so do opinion 
pollsters. Can campaigns predict overall election outcomes better than pollsters do? So far, 
there is only fragmented, anecdotal evidence for that (e.g. Issenberg 2016, 324-5, 348). 
Against that is evidence (admittedly also anecdotal) of precisely the opposite: for example, all 
sides in the 2018 US presidential election, 2017 and 2015 UK general elections and 2016 UK 
Brexit referendum were privately surprised by the results. Neither is there any indirect 
evidence of insider special knowledge, such as telltale activity on political betting markets. 
 
Finally, there are two other alternatives, in some ways more in keeping with big data methods 
generally. First, might one just adopt the ‘n equals all’ approach of asking every voter how 
they will vote? But such an interviewing marathon is not a realistic prescription. Moreover, 
even if it were realistic, it would still address only one of polling’s lesser problems, namely 
sampling error. So, ‘n equals all’ is no panacea. 
 
Second, might one be able to predict elections, not by asking voters anything, but instead by 
tracking indirect indicators such as the number of Google searches of candidates? Alas, this 
method’s record is not encouraging, either for predicting elections or for predicting other 
phenomena such as flu outbreaks. Social media users are often unrepresentative of the target 
groups. Moreover, there is a new source of non-stationarity, namely that Google’s search 
algorithms themselves change frequently (Lazer et al. 2014). 
 
In conclusion, the prediction of elections has improved although predictive accuracy is still 
limited. More data has helped. But there are important limitations on how much useful data 
can ever be available, given the problems of infrequent elections and widespread non-
12 
 
stationarity. These limitations hamper all big data techniques alike, and can be expected to 
continue to in the future.  
 
 
3. Second example: Weather 
Earth’s weather system is widely believed to be chaotic, so that weather outcomes are 
indefinitely sensitive to initial conditions (Lorenz 1969). Moreover, it has also been argued 
that weather predictions are indefinitely sensitive to model errors too – that is, even tiny 
inaccuracies in a model can lead to very large errors in the predictions made by that model 
(Frigg et al. 2014). These difficulties are ominous. Yet, despite them, weather forecasting has 
improved significantly.11 Hurricane paths, for instance, are predicted more accurately and 
more in advance, and temperature and rainfall predictions are more accurate too. Overall, a 
few years ago the reliability of seven-day forecasts had become equal to that of three-day 
forecasts 20 years earlier (Bechtold et al. 2012), and progress has continued since. 
 
Several factors together explain this achievement.12 The first is a huge increase in the quality 
and quantity of available data since the launch of the first weather satellites in the 1960s. 
Temperature, humidity and other reports are of ever greater refinement both horizontally 
(currently increments of 20km squares) and vertically (currently 91 separate altitude layers). 
Over 10 million observations per day are inputted into the models of leading forecasters. 
 
11 I will use the terms ‘prediction’ and ‘forecast’ interchangeably. There is no uniform usage of these two terms 
across different sciences. ‘Prediction’, for instance, may denote any of: in-sample consequences of a model; 
extrapolation to new subjects; deterministic future earthquake claims; probabilistic future climate claims. 
Conversely, ‘forecast’ may denote respectively: forecasts strictly of future, out-of-sample data; forecasts, based 
on past data, only for known subjects; probabilistic future earthquake claims; deterministic future weather 
claims. 
12 See (Northcott 2017) for more details and references regarding this case. 
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The second factor is the forecasting models. At the heart of these models are differential 
equations of fluid dynamics that have been known for hundreds of years. They are assumed 
to govern the fiendishly complex movements of air in the atmosphere, and how those are 
impacted by temperature, pressure, the Earth’s rotation, the cycle of night and day, and so on. 
However, in practice these equations are insufficient to generate accurate weather forecasts. 
Moreover, refining the equations from first principles is not an effective remedy for that. 
Instead, a whole series of ad hoc additions have been made in order to accommodate the 
impacts of various specific factors, such as mountains, clouds, or the coupling of air 
movements and ocean currents. The exact form that these additions take has been determined 
by a trial-and-error process (Jung et al. 2010, Bechtold et al. 2012). They are under-
determined by fundamental theory and indeed they sometimes contradict it.13 
 
Third, new analytical methods have been developed. The most notable innovation dates from 
the late 1990s when models began to feature stochastic terms. This enabled the running of 
multiple simulations to generate probabilistic forecasts. In turn, this ‘ensemble method’ 
overcame the problem of chaos: although any one simulation may go seriously askew, it has 
been found from experience that, as in many chaotic systems, errors tend to cancel out over 
many iterations. As a result, the probabilistic forecasts are unbiased. 
 
Fourth, available computing power has hugely increased, while interacting with other 
advances to enable the new data to be exploited fully. Thus, the ensemble method of 
forecasting was infeasible until sufficient computing power became available, because not 
 
13 The finding that duly refined models can still predict accurately has been the brute empirical solution to the 
problem of sensitivity to model error mentioned earlier. Simply put, it turns out that, after testing, the models do 
predict well despite being literally false in many details. 
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enough simulations could be run in timely fashion. The increase in data and computing power 
have also together enabled the development and exploitation of more sophisticated models. 
And additional data is not just collected blindly; rather, experience of what kind of data most 
improves the accuracy of models’ predictions has informed the choice of instruments on new 
satellites. 
 
With this background in place, let us return to our main concern: what role has big data 
played? First, weather forecasting’s improvement has not been the result of any change in the 
underlying theory of fluid dynamics. Instead, the forecasting model has been repeatedly 
tweaked – and in such a way that it has lost easy theoretical interpretation. Different features 
of the model interact in complex ways so that adjustments are tested holistically in brute 
instrumentalist fashion. The case thus instantiates the stereotypical big data priority for 
predictive success over causal transparency. 
 
The improvements in forecasting accuracy are certainly due in part to exploitation of more 
and better data. They are also due to improvement in data analysis techniques, especially the 
use of ensemble forecasting.14 On the other hand, they are not due to these factors alone. 
Moreover, the improvements are limited: even now, forecasts more than seven or eight days 
ahead cannot beat the baselines of long-run climate averages or simple extrapolation from 
current conditions.  
 
As in the case of elections, a crucial question is: how much could weather forecasting be 
improved by the application of big data methods in the future? What is big data’s upper limit? 
 
14 Knüsel et al. (2019) show how big data techniques can also be combined with theory as part of hybrid 
methods, which are then useful for various subsidiary tasks in the process of prediction, such as finding proxies 
for missing data or modeling clouds or vegetation. 
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First, the availability of even more data will indeed likely help. But any new data must be 
collected by new physical instruments, which requires choices about which instruments to 
deploy and where. While, as noted, these choices are in part informed by the forecasting 
model, they also require theory external to it. Thus, background theory is necessary for new 
data to improve prediction. Moreover, if the weather system is indeed chaotic, only 
probabilistic forecasts will ever be possible. How accurate such forecasts could eventually 
become, how far in advance, is unknown.  
 
Second, big data might also improve weather forecasting via the development or application 
of new methods rather than simply via more data. One possibility is that weather could be 
‘blindly’ predicted by machine learning techniques instead of by, as currently, a model 
adapted from physical theory.15 At first sight, the case does seem to satisfy the conditions 
necessary for such techniques to succeed (sections 6 and 7). To my knowledge, this approach 
has never been tried. It is hard to assess its potential in advance. There is one thing in its 
favor, comparatively speaking: since there is little capacity for causal inference from current 
weather models anyway (section 8), the opportunity cost of a black-box alternative is 
reduced. 
 
4. Third example: Gross Domestic Product 
Predicting GDP has proved very difficult.16 One benchmark is to assume that the growth rate 
of real GDP will stay the same as now. Currently, 12-month forecasts barely outperform this 
benchmark. 18-month forecasts don’t outperform it at all. Forecasts also persistently fail to 
predict turning points, i.e. when GDP growth changes sign. In one study, in 60 cases of 
 
15 I thank Eric Martin for this suggestion. 
16 See (Betz 2006) for more details and references regarding this case. 
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negative growth the consensus forecast was for negative growth on only three of those 
occasions (Loungani 2001). 
 
The record shows little or no sustained difference in the success of different forecasters, 
despite widely varying methods. These methods include: purely numerical extrapolations, 
both informal (chartists) and formal (usually univariate time series models improved by trial 
and error); non-theory-based economic correlations, both informal (indicators and surveys) 
and formal (multivariate time series); and theory-based econometric models, which 
sometimes feature hundreds or even thousands of equations. There is no improved return 
from sophistication, and in particular no superiority of econometric over other methods (Betz 
2006, 30-38). Moreover, unlike in the weather case, the forecasting record has not improved 
in 50 years despite vast increases in available data and computing power in addition to theory 
development. 
 
The induction is, therefore, that more data and computing power will not improve matters. 
Given the complexity of what determines a country’s GDP, no existing forecasting method 
likely captures all of the generating processes. Moreover, it seems likely that, as in the 
elections case, the generating processes are non-stationary. If so, unless it changes over time 
in the right way, no single predictive method will work for long, including any generated by 
machine learning techniques. The difficulty applies to any big data approach. 
 
Besides non-stationarity, GDP forecasting also faces other potential difficulties (Betz 2006, 
101-108):  
1) The economy is an open system. In other words, it is continuously impacted by non-
economic variables, such as election results, that inevitably do not appear in economic 
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forecasting models. (As long ago as 1928, Oskar Morgenstern pointed out that economic 
prediction requires prediction also of non-economic variables.) 
2) The economy is a reflexive system, in other words forecasts may themselves affect the 
economy in such a way as to impede the task of forecasting it.17 
3) Measurement errors are large.18 GDP can only be estimated by aggregating meso-level 
inputs and the details of that process require many statistical estimates and subjective 
judgments. Methods for seasonal adjustment introduce further imprecision. One symptom of 
these difficulties is significant discrepancies between different measuring methods. Another 
symptom is the large size of revisions, which are typically greater than 1% – comparable to 
the average forecast error.  
4) The economy might be a chaotic system, in which case at best only probabilistic forecasts 
are possible. 
 
In addition, one recent argument holds that confirmation of causal hypotheses in 
macroeconomics requires knowledge of unobservable variables, in particular of agent 
expectations, and is therefore necessarily infeasible (Henschen 2018). If so, and if accurate 
forecasting requires a verified causal model (which admittedly it might not), then 
macroeconomic forecasting too is necessarily infeasible. 
 
It may well be that several or even all of these difficulties are significant. No big data method 
is a plausible solution for any of them. Accordingly, even if non-stationarity is somehow 
overcome, big data is not a plausible savior of GDP forecasting.  
 
17 This is why many rational expectations models deem it impossible to forecast systematically better than a 
random baseline. Similar pessimism is applied – perhaps more convincingly – to other economic variables 
besides GDP, such as exchange rates and stock prices. Forecasts of these latter two are, like those of GDP, both 
unimpressive and not improving. 
18 Data quality is a major difficulty for big data analyses generally (section 7). 
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5. Fourth example: Economic auctions 
Laboratory experiments are increasingly common in social science (Kagel and Roth 2016). In 
turn, extrapolation from these experiments is an increasingly common guide to field 
interventions. Such interventions are implicitly predictions of the interventions’ own effects, 
by those who make the interventions. Can big data methods help? I will consider here one 
well-studied case, namely the US government spectrum auctions from the mid-1990s.19  
 
The radio spectrum is the portion of electromagnetic spectrum between 9 kilohertz and 300 
gigahertz. In the USA, parts of the radio spectrum that are not needed for governmental 
purposes are distributed via licenses by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In 
the early 1990s, the FCC acquired the right to do this using competitive market mechanisms 
such as auctions. That left it the formidable task of designing such auctions. The importance 
of doing this well is best illustrated by the embarrassments that occur when it is done badly. 
Examples of that include: an Otago university student winning the license for a small-town 
TV station by bidding just $5 (New Zealand 1990); an unknown outbidding everyone but 
then turning out to have no money, thus delaying paid television for nearly a year as do-over 
auctions had to be run (Australia 1993); and collusion and a subsequent legal fight resulting 
in four big companies buying the four available licenses for prices only one-fifteenth of what 
the government had expected (Switzerland 2000). In contrast, the FCC’s series of seven 
auctions from 1994 to 1996 were a remarkable success. They attracted many bidders, 
allocated nearly two thousand licenses, and raised $20 billion, an amount that surpassed all 
 
19 For more details and references regarding this case, see Guala (2005), Alexandrova (2008), and Alexandrova 
and Northcott (2009). 
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government and industry expectations. Even the first auctions passed off without a glitch, and 
there was reason to believe that licenses were allocated efficiently. 
 
How was this success achieved? A wide range of goals was set by the government besides 
revenue maximization, such as efficient and intensive use of the spectrum, promotion of new 
technologies, and ensuring that some licenses go to favored bidders such as minority- and 
women-owned companies. Exactly what design would achieve these goals was a formidable 
puzzle for teams of economic theorists, experimentalists, lawyers, and software engineers. 
The country was eventually subdivided into 492 basic trading areas, each of which had four 
spectrum blocks up for license. The eventual auction mechanism put all of these licenses up 
for sale simultaneously as opposed to sequentially, in an open rather than sealed-bid 
arrangement. Bidders placed bids on individual licenses as opposed to packages of licenses. 
When a round was over, they saw what other bids had been placed and were free to change 
their own combinations of bids. Bidders were also constrained by a number of further rules, 
such as upfront payments, maintaining a certain level of activity, increasing the values of 
their bids from round to round by prescribed amounts, and caps on the amount of spectrum 
that could be owned in a single geographical area. The full statement of the auction rules was 
over 130 pages. 
 
Game-theoretical models revolutionized the auction literature in the 1980s. However, the 
final spectrum auction design was not derived (or derivable) from game theory alone. Indeed, 
no single model covered anywhere near all of the theoretical issues mentioned above. And in 
addition to instructions covering entry, bidding, and payment, much work also had to be put 
into perfecting other features such as the software, the venue and timing of the auction, and 
whatever aspects of the legal and economic environment the designers could control. Many 
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experiments and consequent ad hoc adjustments and fine-tuning were essential. These took 
the form of extensive testing in laboratory settings with human subjects. The results often 
took designers by surprise. For example, in some circumstances – and against theoretical 
predictions – ‘bubbles’ emerged in the values of the bids. These in turn were unexpectedly 
sensitive to the availability of information about rival bidders’ behavior. Chief experimental 
investigator Charles Plott commented: 
 
Even if the information is not officially available as part of the organized auction, the 
procedures may be such that it can be inferred. For example, if all bidders are in the same 
room, and if exit from the auction is accompanied by a click of a key or a blink of a screen, or 
any number of other subtle sources of information, such bubbles might exist even when 
efforts are made to prevent them. The discovery of such phenomena underscores the need to 
study the operational details of auctions. (Plott 1997, 620) 
 
Experiments showed that the impact of any particular auction rule tended to be dependent 
both on which other rules were included and also on the details of its implementation. Theory 
alone was typically unable to predict the impact of any given rule individually. Because 
individual rules did not have stable effects across different environments the performance of 
any particular set of rules had to be tested holistically, and moreover, tested anew with every 
significant change in environment. This resembles the holistic testing of weather forecasting 
models. The eventual result of a complex testing process was the perfection of one auction 
design as a whole, i.e. of a set of formal rules and practical procedures together.20 
 
In this way, extensive laboratory investigation was the basis for field predictions, namely of 
the outcomes of the eventual auctions. 
 
20 A very similar analysis applies to the even more successful 2000/1 spectrum auctions in the UK. 
21 
 
 
What was the role of big data methods? It was the work in the experimental testbeds, mired in 
messy practical details, that was crucial. The key was not new data about bidders or other 
data that could be collected from existing sources, nor was the key better analysis of such 
data. Rather, the relevant new data had to be created by running experiments and trials. A lot 
of the benefit from these experiments, as Plott makes clear, came in the form of practical 
know-how. This was what made the difference. 
 
What about future prospects for big data methods? We have asked this question for each of 
our examples. The auctions case reveals an implicit assumption. Unlike in many big data 
success stories, there was no prospect here of simply applying big data techniques to a stock 
of pre-existing data. Instead, because the relevant data were actively and purposefully 
created, it was necessary to decide what data to create. Prospects for prediction depended on 
these decisions, and therefore they depended too on the background theory essential to 
making those decisions. 
 
The type of predictive progress in the auctions case is different too. Much of the ‘data’ 
relevant to predictive success were practical know-how, which by its nature tends to be 
context- and task-specific. Accordingly, progress takes the form of predictive success in one 
task and then another task and then another, and so on. There is no trend of a greater degree 
of predictive success, rather only a greater scope. 
 
The details of the auction case do not bode well for big data advocates. Success required 
intricate knowledge of the context of application and active creation of relevant data. Both of 
these require background theory and are not a matter of better machine learning or data 
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mining. Thus, if the auction case is indicative, big data methods will not improve the 
derivation of field predictions from laboratory experiments.  
 
 
6. Conditions for big data predictive success 
Summarizing the upshots of the four cases: prediction of weather and elections has improved 
somewhat. In both cases, more data are part of the reason, as are improved analytical 
techniques, although sophisticated machine learning methods are not. GDP prediction has not 
improved; neither more data nor more sophisticated techniques to analyze that data have 
helped, and they do not seem likely to in the future. With economic auctions, accurate 
prediction about the impact of interventions requires fresh data to be created with each 
application, and progress is with regard to scope rather than accuracy; big data techniques of 
data analysis are irrelevant. Overall, the picture is therefore mixed: more data does help 
sometimes (not surprisingly), but it is not a panacea anywhere because lack of data is one of, 
but not the only, constraint on predictive success. New data analysis techniques have been 
valuable in some cases, but machine learning methods have not played a role. 
 
What determines if big data methods succeed? There has been much work on this question, 
by both philosophers of science and practitioners. The surveys by the philosopher Wolfgang 
Pietsch are a useful starting point (2015, 2016).21 Pietsch discusses several predictive 
methods that are widespread in data science. One is classificatory trees, which use a number 
of parameters to determine whether a certain instance belongs to a particular group. Examples 
include: predicting on the basis of demographic variables which candidate a voter will prefer; 
predicting on the basis of surf history, cookies and past purchases which product a consumer 
 
21 For references and more detailed discussion, see these Pietsch papers. 
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will prefer; and using genetic and environmental factors to predict whether a patient will 
suffer a certain disease. A second method is nonparametric regression, which, roughly 
speaking, seeks to account for data using minimal modeling assumptions, thereby allowing 
great flexibility as to the eventual predictive model’s functional form. This method has 
become feasible only recently because it is so computationally and data intensive. (The 
contrast between nonparametric and parametric regression is similar to that between data and 
algorithmic models.) 
 
Pietsch identifies four conditions necessary for such investigations to predict successfully 
(2015, 910-11):  
1) Vocabulary is well chosen, i.e. parameters are stable causal categories 
2) All potentially relevant parameters are known 
3) Background conditions are sufficiently stable 
4) There are sufficient instances to cover all potentially relevant configurations 
Label these the Pietsch conditions. These conditions apply to big data methods generally, i.e. 
to techniques of machine learning and data mining. 
 
To see the need for Condition 1: suppose variable X perfectly correlates with Z but Y does 
not. So, we may predict Z by tracking X. But suppose instead we track only a composite 
variable X + Y. Then we will fail to predict Z accurately, missing the chance to exploit X. In 
our four case studies though, satisfying this condition was not the relevant constraint. 
 
The importance of Condition 2 is obvious. Arguably, whenever full predictive success is 
absent, we cannot be sure this condition is satisfied. GDP and elections are especially clear 
examples. 
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Condition 3 refers to non-stationarity, which we have come across already. Any correlation 
that might be exploited for prediction is presumably generated by some underlying causal 
process. If that process is unstable then its exploitation may become impossible. Exactly this 
problem severely limits the efficacy of big data methods for predicting GDP and, to some 
extent, elections. By contrast, the relative stability of the causal processes underlying the 
Earth’s weather enable big data methods to be much more effective there. 
 
Condition 4 is that the available dataset must be sufficiently rich. Ideally, it should include all 
relevant configurations of cause and effect variables, else some predictive patterns may be 
missed. (In practice, even less than this ideal might still enable accurate prediction in a 
limited range.) Satisfying this condition was the biggest problem in the elections case: the 
relatively small number of elections is insufficient for selecting between all of the many 
possible causal hypotheses. Again, weather is a contrast case, because we have ample records 
of every relevant combination of weather causes and outcomes. 
 
7. Augmenting the Pietsch conditions 
In the well-known big data success stories, the Pietsch conditions are satisfied: the underlying 
generating process is stable enough, the training set of combinations is rich enough, and the 
variables are well-chosen enough, that we can infer reliably predictive patterns. For example, 
the process that causes some rather than other New York City manholes to blow seems to be 
relatively stable, and it was possible to collect a large enough dataset to identify the relevant 
correlations (Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier 2013). Thus, the Pietsch conditions do 
illuminate actual cases. Nevertheless, the case studies enable us to address several further 
issues.  
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First, most simply, are the Pietsch conditions actually satisfied in important cases? It seems 
that they were in the weather example but not in our other ones. 
 
Second, why might the Pietsch conditions sometimes not be satisfied? One reason is a system 
being open, thus threatening the stability condition because an effect may be unpredictably 
influenced by unmodeled factors. A system being open also threatens the condition that all 
relevant parameters are known (elections, GDP). Another reason concerns the sufficient data 
condition, which may be threatened either because too few iterations exist of the relevant 
event (elections) or because the relevant data are too contextual (auctions).22 
 
Third, are the Pietsch conditions sufficient for accurate prediction? One lesson of the case 
studies is that they are not. The GDP case illustrates well further possible barriers, such as 
measurement error or a system being chaotic.23 The weather and election cases highlight the 
necessity sometimes of other factors too, such as the availability of the new techniques of 
ensemble forecasts and polling aggregation. 
 
Perhaps these various difficulties can all be recast simply as failures to satisfy Pietsch’s 
conditions: an open system implies either non-stationarity or incorrect vocabulary; reflexivity 
implies non-stationarity; and measurement errors, unobservable variables, and too few events 
 
22 A further potential difficulty is a system being reflexive (section 4), as many social systems may be, leading 
again to a failure of stationarity. It has been suggested that this may apply to elections and GDP, although if it 
does it is not clear how significantly. 
23 The examples also illustrate remedies for some of these difficulties. In the weather case, for instance, the 
ensemble method makes possible the (probabilistic) prediction even of a chaotic system. 
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each implies the unavailability of sufficient (accurate) data.24 But the point is that most of the 
real work now consists in assessing when and why the conditions will actually apply, so there 
is no substitute for supplementary local investigation. 
 
This contextualist moral also leads to the recognition that prediction may often be an 
amalgam of various methods, some of which rely on large datasets and make use of big data 
methods such as machine learning, while others do not. Even if big data does not improve 
overall predictions, it might still be helpful for certain local modeling tasks where theory is 
scarce but data are not. Thus, often the impact of big data on prediction in any given domain 
is not all-or-nothing. Knüsel et al. (2019) illustrate this in the context of climate science. 
There are examples in our case studies too. For instance, as noted, political campaigns 
successfully use big data methods to predict and influence many aspects of voter behavior.25 
 
Fourth, the importance of background theoretical knowledge is underlined. Such knowledge 
is often an essential guide to choosing the Pietschian correct vocabulary, as in both the 
election and weather cases. It is often crucial too for correcting non-stationarity, and for 
offering guidance regarding extrapolation (section 8; see also Knüsel et al. 2019, 199). That 
 
24 The distinctions between Pietsch’s different conditions are themselves fuzzy, as sometimes the same issue can 
be assigned to more than one of the categories. For example, suppose that in the 1980s in the UK buying a Ford 
Fiesta car predicts support for Conservatives but that by 1997 it predicts support for Labour. This is a case of 
non-stationarity. But suppose we re-describe the situation in terms of a more fundamental causal relation, 
perhaps that ‘middlebrow voters vote for middlebrow politicians’. This new relation is plausibly stable across 
the different elections. If so, rather than non-stationarity, the initial problem would become a case of incorrect 
vocabulary, or perhaps that not all relevant parameters are known. Generally, any open system is vulnerable to 
disruption by unmodelled variables, and thus a problem of non-stationarity is always vulnerable to being re-
classified in this way. 
25 See also https://www.facebook.com/business/success/rick-scott-for-florida#u_0_0 and 
https://www.facebook.com/business/success/snp for controversial (claimed) examples. I thank an anonymous 
referee for raising the issues in this paragraph. 
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is, theoretical knowledge is beneficial even just for the narrow goal of better prediction.26 
Election predictions, for example, can be improved by incorporating systematic turnout 
differences between US midterm and presidential years, or by understanding why turnout 
patterns changed between the 2015 and 2017 UK elections. And theory informed the 
experiments that gathered the relevant data in the auctions case. It is also a commonplace that 
background theory and knowledge of the data-generating mechanism are often essential to 
handling likely data errors effectively (Foster et al. 2017, 180). 
 
A note of caution though: although background theory is thus indispensable, at the same time 
theory alone does not predict successfully in the field. All of the case studies confirm that. 
The weather forecasting models require many ad hoc adjustments that go beyond, or even 
contradict, basic theory; models of elections based on fundamentals are out-predicted by 
opinion polling; theory-based forecasts of GDP fare no better than those based on other 
methods; and the spectrum auction design was not derived, or derivable, from game-
theoretical models but rather used those models only as heuristic starting points to be 
repeatedly refined by sui generis experiments. As a result of this need for extra-theoretical 
input, predictive success when it is achieved is local and hard to extrapolate to new contexts. 
Evidence suggests that this pattern is typical of field cases generally (Tetlock and Gardner 
2015). Recent work suggests that machine learning methods likewise predict best by avoiding 
theory-driven models (Mullainathan and Spiess 2017). In our case studies, more data do not 
counter this anti-theory trend; if anything, they exacerbate it. 
 
There have also been analyses from big data practitioners themselves. There is some overlap 
between these and Pietsch’s conditions. Correct choice of variables is recognized as key for 
 
26 Sabina Leonelli (2016) compellingly emphasizes the same point for the field of systems biology. 
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making machine learning methods work, for instance. However, it is notable that 
practitioners have markedly different emphases. Perhaps the biggest issue for them is 
ensuring data quality, which is a catch-all for a range of more specific issues, such as whether 
data are representative, whether there are measurement errors, and whether the data capture 
what we want them to – often data are repurposed, being the products of instruments and 
methods not designed with data scientists in mind (Foster et al. 2017, 276-285; Japec et al. 
2015, 848-850). Such concerns are captured by the Pietsch conditions at best only implicitly. 
 
In our case studies, however, while data quality issues such as the reliability of polling 
evidence and weather measurements are concerns, they are not the biggest constraints on 
predictive accuracy. Conversely, what is in practice the biggest such constraint, namely non-
stationarity, is comparatively neglected by practitioner analyses.27 In this way, the case 
studies augment them too. 
 
 
8. Theory and causal understanding 
The case studies also shed light on causal understanding. Advocacy for big data methods has 
often celebrated those methods’ lack of connection to causal inference: the ‘death of theory’ 
heralds an emphasis instead exclusively on correlation and prediction (Mayer-Schoenberger 
and Cukier 2013, Hey et al. 2009). But this is not quite right, as theoretical analysis and case 
studies together reveal. 
 
 
27 This despite the fact that non-stationarity is a classic concern in statistics, with many associated diagnostic 
tests. Knüsel et al. (2019) is one exception to the pattern, as they do take what they call ‘constancy’ in the data 
to be in practice the most important condition to satisfy. 
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Pietsch (2016) shows how some big data methods can offer causal inference – up to a point. 
In particular, examining patterns of covariation enables these methods to identify INUS 
causes in the sense of (Mackie 1980), even though the available evidence is only 
observational.28 If we assume a stable causal background then INUS causes in turn license 
interventions because actual variations can stand as proxies for the relevant counterfactual 
ones. Thus, one benefit of theory can be achieved even by ‘theory-free’ big data methods. On 
the other hand, these same methods are vulnerable to spurious correlations in the same way as 
Mackie himself noted for INUS causes, and as practitioners recognize too (Foster et al. 2017, 
277-279). The best defense against such spurious correlations is to import background 
knowledge – and so theory reappears. Moreover, INUS causes merely mark patterns of 
covariation. They do not provide mechanistic or other underlying explanations of those 
patterns, nor therefore any understanding of why they hold, nor therefore any guidance as to 
when they will extrapolate to new contexts. To plug these gaps, again background theory is 
required. 
 
The case studies demonstrate that, in practice, causal understanding is hard to deliver. Even 
given relative predictive success (weather, elections, auctions), our ability to explain has 
increased very little. Testing of the weather model and the auction design was holistic, 
militating against assigning causal responsibility to particular factors and thus against causal 
explanations.29 Generally, the theoretical demonstration of the possibility of causal inference 
by big data methods turns out to be mostly inapplicable to our cases, because an algorithmic 
search for correlations from which INUS causes can be inferred is too simple a method to be 
 
28 ‘INUS’ stands for an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition. 
29 Lenhard (2018) argues that holistic testing tells against causal inference in complex simulation models 
generally. 
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useful. Rather, there are breakdowns of stationarity (elections, GDP, auctions), or insufficient 
data (elections), or the data need to be created (auctions).  
 
The picture is not quite wholly bleak though. Causal understanding is occasionally achievable 
in the weather case (Northcott 2017). At root, this is because of the exceptional quantity of 
data available. For example, recently, there have been extensive changes to the model’s 
treatment of convection schemes in the tropics and to its treatment of the radiative properties 
of ice clouds. These changes have, of course, been thoroughly tested for their impact on 
predictive success and refined accordingly. But in addition, the data allowed modelers to test 
whether the two changes composed non-linearly or not. In this case, it was found that the 
non-linear – i.e. interactive – effects were relatively small. Accordingly, empirically verified 
changes in model outputs (i.e. successful predictions) could now be attributed to particular 
changes in model inputs; that is, some causal transparency was returned. 
 
Some limited extrapolation was possible in the auction and election examples too, as work 
from earlier cases helped with later cases such as the UK spectrum auction of 2000/1 and 
later US presidential elections. Still, even then this extrapolatory help was far from infallible, 
as witnessed by the failure of the 2000 spectrum auction in Switzerland and (relative) failure 
of forecasting of UK parliamentary elections. Usually, new models are needed each time 
(Northcott 2017). 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
In the right circumstances, the Pietsch conditions are satisfied, and big data methods do 
significantly advance field prediction. They enable the best possible use to be made of a 
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given body of data, and they promise still more predictive success as new techniques and 
more data become available. But often the binding constraint is neither lack of data nor our 
inefficient use of them. Instead, prediction may be hindered by a system being non-stationary 
(elections, GDP, auctions), or chaotic, open, or reflexive (weather, GDP, perhaps others). 
These hinder all big data methods alike. Or a lack of relevant data cannot feasibly be 
remedied (elections), or new data can, in whole or in part, only be collected with non-big-data 
methods (auctions, elections, weather, GDP). Such problems may be frequent and 
unfortunately may affect those cases that we most want to predict.30 
 
There is still a need for theory and thus for human experts – in part because it is this that 
enables some predictive progress even in the face of the difficulties above. Theory and 
experts ubiquitously inform both the correct choice of variables to analyze and the collection 
of data in the first place. They are essential to the ‘internal’ operation of prediction too. 
Nevertheless, despite this continued role for theory, the possibilities for causal inference are 
often very limited. 
 
Our case studies illuminate all of these issues. Overall, they suggest caution about whether 
prediction, and thus scientific method generally, will really be revolutionized by big data. 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Are social sciences more prone than natural sciences to these problems? I do not yet see convincing evidence 
of that. Natural language translation and internet company experiments are success cases from social science. 
The only problem specific to social science is reflexivity, and it is not clear how often reflexivity is predictively 
significant. 
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